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COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND SETTLEMENT:
EMPIRICAL INSIGHTS INTO THE ROLES ARBITRATORS PLAY
By
Thomas J. Stipanowich* & Zachary P. Ulrich**

I.

INTRODUCTION

It is generally understood that arbitrators adjudicate disputes and mediators help
settle them through negotiated agreement.1 But what role, if any, is there for arbitrators
in promoting settlement? This aspect of arbitration is overlooked in some quarters,2
while occasionally provoking controversy.3 A thoroughgoing consideration of the
subject is long overdue.4
*
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1

See, e.g., John W. Cooley, Arbitration vs. Mediation – Explaining the Differences, 69 JUDICATURE 263
(1986).
2

See Paul M. Lurie, Using the guided choice process to reduce the cost of resolving construction disputes,
9 CONSTR. L. INT’L 18, 19 (Mar. 2014) (“The legal profession generally sees arbitration as an alternative to
a court proceeding; they do not see customized arbitration as a method to develop information which can
affect settlement positions and break impasses”).
3

See infra text accompanying notes 99-105.

4

A step forward in terms of international dialogue on the subject is represented by a recent effort by the
Centre for Dispute Resolution (CEDR). See Centre for Effective Dispute Resolution, CEDR COMMISSION
ON SETTLEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION, FINAL REPORT, 3, 11-12 (Nov. 2009) [hereinafter CEDR
COMMISSION
REPORT],
available
at
http://www.cedr.com/about_us/arbitration_commission/Arbitration_Commission_Doc_Final.pdf
(reporting results of a commission sponsored by CEDR, the London-based mediation and mediation
training organization), discussed infra text accompanying notes 91-105. The resulting Recommendations
and Rules have stirred controversy. See infra text accompanying notes 99-105. See generally Sophie
Nappert & Dieter Flader, A Psychological Perspective on the Facilitation of Settlement in International
Arbitration—Examining the CEDR Rules, 2 J. INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 459 (2011) (raising questions about
the basic premises of the CEDR Recommendations in light of considerations regarding the psychological
makeup and cultural background of arbitrators).

1

The Rules of Ethics for International Arbitrators of the International Bar
Association begin with a single “fundamental rule” that calls upon arbitrators to “proceed
diligently and efficiently to provide the parties with a just and effective resolution of their
disputes . . . . ”5 The Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes,6 the
primary ethical framework for commercial arbitrators in the United States, admonishes
arbitrators to “[c]onduct the [p]roceedings [f]airly and [d]iligently.”7 Arbitrators might
reasonably interpret these standards to require them to manage the adjudicative process
through to an award in as cost-effective and expeditious a way as is consistent with
fundamental fairness. But should their ethical obligations extend to helping promote an
early resolution of a dispute by means of settlement, which is very often the best way of
achieving cost-savings and efficiency as well as a satisfactory result?8 If so, just how far
should these obligations extend, and what commensurate obligations lie with legal
advocates and other stakeholders?
One relevant new source of information about arbitrators’ current practices and
perspectives, including (among many other topics) their roles in “setting the stage” for
settlement, is an extensive recent survey of experienced arbitrators co-sponsored by the
College of Commercial Arbitrators (“CCA”), an organization comprised of more than
two hundred of the U.S.’ most experienced and distinguished arbitrators, and the Straus
Institute for Dispute Resolution (“the Survey”).9 In 2013 the CCA invited the Institute to
conduct a wide-ranging canvass of practices and perspectives of CCA members.10 The
5

INTERNATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATION, IBA RULES OF ETHICS FOR INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATORS 1, 2
(1987),
available
at
http://www.ibanet.org/Publications/publications_IBA_
guides_and_free_materials.aspx#ethics. The IBA Rules go on to emphasize arbitrators’ “[d]uty of
[d]iligence,” specifying that arbitrators “should devote such time and attention as the parties may
reasonably require having regard to all the circumstances of the case, and shall do their base to conduct the
arbitration in such a manner that costs do not rise to an unreasonable proportion of the interests at stake.”
Id. at 4, Section 7.
6

See THE CODE OF ETHICS FOR ARBITRATORS IN COMMERCIAL DISPUTES (EFFECTIVE MARCH 1, 2004),
available at https://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowProperty?nodeId=/UCM/A DRSTG_003867.
7

See id., Canon IV. An Arbitrator Should Conduct the Proceedings Fairly and Diligently (emphasis added).

8

See CEDR COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 1, ¶ 1.5 (studies of attitudes of international business
regarding dispute resolution show “parties generally want their problems solved cost effectively and
efficiently and …this will often be best achieved through negotiated settlement). Cf. Andrew J. Wistrich &
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, How Lawyer’s Intuitions Prolong Litigation, 86 SO. CAL L. REV.571, 573 (2013)
(“[M]ost observers recognize that settlements harness the judgment of the attorneys and often a settlement
judge or other mediator to offer the parties an acceptable resolution of their dispute without the expense
that further litigation would entail.”).
9

College of Commercial Arbitrators-Straus Institute for Dispute Resolution Survey on Arbitration Practice
(Fall 2013) [hereinafter “the Survey”].
10

The Survey was conducted under the umbrella of the Straus Institute’s Theory-to-Practice Research
Project in connection with a report on the future of arbitration which Professor Stipanowich was invited to
present to the CCA during the fall of 2013. The Survey consisted of 65 multiple-choice and short-answer
questions on respondents’ arbitration experiences and opinions on arbitration practices and the future of the
arbitration field-at-large. The Survey asked questions pertaining both “domestic” (defined in the Survey as
“in the U.S. between U.S. parties”) and “international” (all other) arbitrations. The Survey was sent
electronically to 225 individuals, all CCA Fellows, of whom 134 individuals (59.6% of the subject pool)

2

Survey results depict a professional cadre of arbitrators with broad and varied
professional backgrounds as lawyers and judges,11 most of whom arbitrate international
cases as well as disputes between U.S. parties.12 As reflected in Chart A, roughly twothirds of respondents indicated they spend at least half of their working hours arbitrating
cases.13

completed the survey instrument. The Survey and associated data are available from Professor
Stipanowich upon request.
Subjects were given the option of whether or not to indicate their gender or age. At the time the
Survey was administered, the average age of those respondents indicating their age (110 individuals) was
around 65 years of age. Eighty-five percent (85.0%) of survey participants indicating their gender (123
individuals) represented that they were male.
11

Among respondents, 81.9% reported having “litigation” backgrounds, 28.4% reported having
“transactional-attorney” backgrounds and 9.5% reported having” judicial” backgrounds (these categories
were not mutually exclusive). The participant pool had a mean arbitration-career length of more than 20
years (calculated as a weighted average of responses to a multiple-choice question asking respondents to
choose among several ranges indicating the length of time that has passed since they first arbitrated a case,
and using the lowest-possible value for each range) and 78.7% of respondents reported having practiced as
arbitrators for at least 20 years. Further, respondents indicated a mean of at least 170 arbitrations each
(calculated using the same weighted-average methodology as described above), and over two-thirds of
participants (67.7%) reported having served as an arbitrator over 100 times throughout their career.
12

The great majority (84.4%) of respondents indicated they had previously arbitrated an international
dispute. Of those who had done so, almost half (47.7%) had averaged at least one international case per
year for the last five years, and almost one-third (32.7%) averaged at least two international cases per year.
13

Nearly three-fourths (74.0%) of respondents indicated that they still worked “full time,” and of those who
did not work full time over ninety percent (90.9%) worked “at least occasionally.” Given the level of the
subjects’ ongoing professional activities, it is of note that nearly two-thirds (65.8%) of participants
indicated they spend half or more of their work time as arbitrators, while almost twenty percent (19.8%) of
respondents indicated that “over 90%” of their work time is spent as an arbitrator.
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Chart A. Percentage of Working Hours as an Arbitrator
Q: What percent of your work time is currently devoted to practice as an arbitrator?
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20.6%
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Percentage of Working Time

Among other things, the resulting data highlight variations in current arbitrator
beliefs and behavior and provide a foundation for more intensive discussion and debate
about how and why arbitrators do what they do.14 At a time when the trend toward
professionalization captured in this Survey parallels the continuing global expansion and
evolution of arbitration practice,15 insights from empirical initiatives of this kind may
serve as a critical element in what some have envisioned as an “informed convergence”
or harmonization of perspectives and practices in arbitration.16
14

An overview and general analysis of the Survey data is forthcoming in Thomas J. Stipanowich &
Zachary P. Ulrich, Arbitration in Evolution: Current Practices and Perspectives of Experienced
Commercial Arbitrators (draft available from authors).
15

See Yves Dezalay & Bryant G. Garth, DEALING IN VIRTUE: INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
CONSTRUCTION OF A TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 37 (The University of Chicago Press 1996)
(quoting pre-eminent arbitrator and arbitration practitioner Jan Paulsson, stating “the age of innocence has
come to an end . . . [and] the delightful discipline of a handful of academic aficionados . . . has become a
matter of serious concern for great numbers of professionals determined to master a process because it is
essential to their business.”); see also Catherine A. Rogers, The Vocation of International Arbitrators, 20
AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 957, 992-99 (2005) (arguing that the field of international arbitration is a profession
because, among other reasons, by nature the field provides many of the same services often ascribed to
lawyers and judges).
AND THE

16

Shahla F. Ali, The Morality of Conciliation: An Empirical Examination of Arbitrator “Role Moralities”
in East Asia and the West, 16 HARV. NEG. L. REV. 1, 4 (2011). We recognize that there is a “possible gap
between what professional actors believe they are doing in a given institutional context and what they are
actually doing.” See Nappert & Flader, supra note 4, at 464. We are confident, however, that much of the
data from this Survey will measurably advance our discussion of a number of topics confronting
commercial arbitration.

4

As professional providers of private justice, arbitrators must heed Aristotle’s
admonition to exercise their virtue for another’s good and not for themselves.17 In the
present environment, this involves doing something more than simply operating in
accordance with one’s own intuitive lights. Given the intensity of present discourse
within the web of arbitration networks regarding virtually every aspect of arbitration
practice and procedure, present-day arbitrators should be increasingly mindful of the
legal and ethical obligations they shoulder in the course of their practice, and be
reflective and deliberate about what they do and how they do it. Through listservs18 and
blogs,19 growing thousands converse online, en masse, on a daily basis, sharing
perspectives on diverse issues of arbitration law and practice from legal doctrine to
psychological insights regarding negotiation and decision-making. Such networks herald
a new era of unprecedented discussion, debate and re-examination regarding current
practices, encouraging persistent and rigorous questioning about the often-difficult
practical realities that repose in the belly of our time-honored norms.
The role of arbitrators in promoting the informal settlement of disputes before
them is a subject that is ripe for deliberation and debate. The topic is intertwined with
concerns regarding efficiency and economy in arbitration, which in recent years has been
the subject of continuing attention and discussion.20 A recent poll of international
corporate counsel focusing on the financial services, energy and construction industries
revealed that cost and delay are frequently concerns of parties to international
arbitration.21 A 2011 survey of Fortune 1,000 corporate counsel indicated that although
saving money and saving time are the two leading reasons for major companies to choose
17

“[J]ustice, alone of the virtues, is thought to be 'another's good', because it is related to our neighbor[.]
. . . [T]he best man is not he who exercises his virtue towards himself but he who exercises it towards
another; for this is a difficult task.” ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, 2010 Pepperdine.elib.com,
*108-09.
18

See, e.g., Oil-Gas-Energy-Mining-Infrastructure Dispute Management Listserv, ogemid@ogeltdm.com;
Mediation and Arbitration Forum listserv, mediate-and-arbitrate@peach.ease.lsoft.com.
19

See, e.g., Kluwer Arbitration Blog, http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com (last accessed May 22, 2014);
Arbitration Nation, http://arbitrationnation.com (last accessed May 22, 2014).
20

See Michael McIlwrath & Roland Schroeder, Transparency in International Arbitration: What Are
Arbitrators and Institutions Afraid Of?, CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND
MEDIATION: THE FORDHAM PAPERS 2010 (Arthur Rovine, ed.) 333 (2011); Richard Chernick & Robert B.
Davidson, The Search for Cost Effective and Efficient International Commercial Arbitration: There is a
Solution, THE INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE LEGAL GUIDE TO: INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 2011: A
PRACTICAL CROSS-BORDER INSIGHT INTO INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION WORK 8 (2011). See also Thomas J.
Stipanowich, Arbitration: The “New Litigation,” 2010 ILL. L. REV. 1, 5 (2010).
21

Queen Mary University of London & PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2013 International Arbitration Survey:
Corporate Choices in International Arbitration, Industry Perspectives 2013, at 6, 8, 21, 22
http://www.pwc.com/arbitrationstudy/. The report states that these concerns are consistently cited by users
of arbitral processes, although they may not factor highly into parties’ actual decision-making when they
decide whether or not to initiate arbitration proceedings. The report also notes the “intense debate
surrounding cost and delay” having raised concerns among some of the largest corporate users of
international arbitration, and states that more than 40% of respondents were influenced by the “overall cost
of service” in selecting an arbitral institution once having already decided to arbitrate.

5

some form of alternative dispute resolution over litigation,22 unease about arbitrationrelated costs is actually perceived as a barrier to the use of commercial arbitration by a
growing number of companies.23
Concerns about mounting costs and dispute resolution cycle time have inspired
important initiatives aimed at availing users of choices that facilitate more cost-effective
and expeditious arbitration.24 While these efforts tend to focus on hastening the
rendering of judgment, they also encompass approaches that may set the stage for and
encourage negotiation and other informal avenues of settlement. 25 As noted above, early
settlement of a dispute can be a uniquely effective way of minimizing cost and cycle time
in dispute resolution.26 But the role of arbitrators in setting the stage for or facilitating
settlement has not been given significant attention, at least in places like the U.S.27
Responses to the CCA-Straus Institute Survey indicate that, as was the experience
in recent decades with litigated cases,28 settlement during the course of arbitration
procedures, and prior to award, is becoming increasingly prevalent.29 Curiously,
however, many experienced arbitrators apparently do not perceive their arbitral role as
extending to the promotion of settlement.30 The roots of such perceptions are unclear, but
may in some cases reflect an all-consuming focus on the arbitrator’s adjudicative
function.31 This focus may be reinforced by the sense of discomfort some may feel about
shifting to a facilitative role, either because it requires different skills and a different
mindset,32 or because it is viewed as incompatible or even detrimental to the arbitral
22

Thomas J. Stipanowich & Ryan J. Lamare, Living with ADR: Evolving Perceptions and Use of
Mediation, Arbitration and Conflict Management in Fortune 1,000 Corporations, 19 HARV. NEGOT. L.
REV. 1, 37, tbl. D (2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2221471.
23

See id. at 53, tbl. P (22.9% of companies see costs as a barrier to the use of arbitration in corporate
/commercial disputes in 2011, as compared to 14.8% who saw costs as a barrier to the use of arbitration
generally in 1997).
24

See Thomas J. Stipanowich, Part II. Soft Law in the Organization and General Conduct of Commercial
Arbitration Proceedings (2014) in SOFT LAW IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (Lawrence W. Newman &
Michael Radine, ed. 2014) available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 2407187; see also, e.g., Robert H. Smit &
Tyler B. Robinson, Cost Awards in International Commercial Arbitration: Proposed Guidelines for
Promoting Time and Cost Efficiency, 20 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 267, 267-68, 279-84 (2009) (advocating for
revised guidelines on allocating arbitration costs in arbitration agreements).
25

See infra notes 72-89 and accompanying text.

26

See infra text accompanying note 48.

27

See CEDR COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 1, ¶ 1.3 (noting that “it is only in certain jurisdictions
that tribunals are active in [encouraging settlement]”).
28

See infra notes 106-109 and accompanying text.

29

See infra Part III.A.

30

See infra Part III.B.

31

See infra text accompanying note 113.

32

See infra text accompanying note 115.
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role.33 (As we will see, however, it is possible for arbitrators to play a role in settlement
without actively facilitating or mediating.) For some, a perhaps-unconscious motivation
to ignore opportunities to promote settlement may lie in the desire to maintain sufficient
hours of commercial arbitration work in an increasingly competitive environment.34
On the other hand, many experienced arbitrators are conducting themselves as
proactive managers of the case before them,35 and many perceive a connection between
their activities and settlement.36 One of the most effective means by which arbitrators
“set the stage” for settlement is by ruling upon dispositive motions, another focus of
Survey questions.37 A sizable minority of Survey respondents have gone so far as to take
more direct action in facilitating settlement, sometimes by embracing dual roles in
resolving a dispute (that is, by serving as both a mediator and an arbitrator).38 In Part II
we will briefly consider the function of settlement in the quest for economy and
efficiency in dispute resolution and the various approaches aimed directly at promotion of
settlement, such as stepped dispute resolution, creative variants, and “med-arb.”39 We
will then discuss ways in which techniques featured in recent initiatives promoting more
cost-effective and expeditious arbitration may also lay the groundwork for settlement,40
as well as the more contentious ground traversed by the CEDR Commission on
Settlement in International Arbitration.41 Part III will compare Survey results showing a
recent increase in the incidence of pre-hearing and pre-award settlement in arbitration,42
as well as Survey responses reflecting experienced arbitrators’ differing perspectives
toward their role respecting informal settlement during arbitration.43 Part IV will explore
the activities of arbitrators who do engage in activities which they regard as setting the
stage for settlement44 and focus particularly on approaches to the handling of dispositive
motions in arbitration45 as well as the more controversial approach involving a single
33

See infra text accompanying notes 116-17.

34

See infra text accompanying notes 118-19.

35

See infra Parts IV.A., B.

36

See infra Table E, p. 21.

37

See infra Part IV.B.

38

See infra Part IV.C.

39

See infra Part II.A.

40

See infra Part II.B.

41

See infra Part II.C.

42

See infra Part III.A.

43

See infra Part III.B.

44

See infra Part IV.A.

45

See infra Part IV.B.
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individual serving the dual roles of mediator and arbitrator.46 In Part V, we conclude by
offering some straightforward proposals to stimulate appropriate involvement by
arbitrators as well as attorneys and other “stakeholders” in setting the stage for
settlement.

II.

TECHNIQUES FOR PROMOTING SETTLEMENT IN DISPUTE RESOLUTION

Respondents to a 2011 survey of corporate counsel in Fortune 1,000 corporations
identified each of the following goals as among the reasons companies choose ADR
(alternative or appropriate dispute resolution) over litigation: saving time (70.9% of
respondents); saving money (68.7%); allowing parties to resolve disputes themselves
(52.4%); limiting discovery (51.5%); preserving privacy and confidentiality (46.8%); and
preserving good relationships (43.5%).47 Each of these goals is likely to be effectively
served—indeed, perhaps best served—by a negotiated settlement of disputes occurring as
early as possible after a dispute arises.48
In recognition of the potential benefits of early settlement many parties to
commercial contracts include stepped dispute resolution provisions that call for early
negotiation and mediation prior to binding arbitration or litigation; some have sought to
overcome the limitations of these “linear” approaches by creative variations, including
casting neutrals in dual roles. In addition, recent initiatives aimed at promoting
efficiency and economy in arbitration proceedings have created additional opportunities
for early resolution or settlement, while the CEDR Commission took a more direct—and
controversial—step by casting arbitrators in a more formal role as settlement facilitators.
A. Promotion of Settlement in Dispute Resolution through Stepped Systems

Stepped dispute resolution provisions in commercial contracts are a
straightforward response to the reality that most business disputes are amenable to a
negotiated resolution, and that there are multiple benefits associated with early, informal
resolution of disputes.49 Stepped approaches are intended to function as a series of sieves
or filters to cull out all of the issues and controversies that may be resolved short of
binding adjudication. Where direct negotiation between representatives of the parties is
unavailing, the intervention of a mediator may help break the logjam and craft a workable
resolution.50
46

See infra Part IV.C.

47

Stipanowich & Lamare, supra note 22, at 37, tbl. D.

48

See COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AT ITS BEST: SUCCESSFUL STRATEGIES FOR BUSINESS USERS (Thomas J.
Stipanowich & Peter H. Kaskell, eds. 2001) [hereinafter COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AT ITS BEST] at 5-6
(discussing priorities for business conflict management). See also Wistrich & Rachlinski, supra note 8, at
575 (“Although faster is not always better when it comes to settlements, it is usually better”).
49

See id., Chapter 1 (discussing role importance of multi-tiered approaches for management of conflict and
avoiding stand-alone arbitration provisions). See also CEDR COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 4,
¶4.2.1 (discussing benefits of multi-tier dispute resolution clauses).
50

See id. at 11-14.
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But the linear arrangement of elements in multi-stage dispute resolution templates
does not take account of the reality that dispute resolution is very often “non-linear.” It is
frequently not viewed as possible or practicable to settle a case before the filing of an
arbitration demand. This may be because of differing (and often, unrealistic)
expectations on the part of counsel or parties regarding the likely disposition of issues
should the case go to trial or arbitration or the settlement value of a case,51 the perceived
need for more information,52 or other factors. Recent empirical research indicates that
legal advocates’ judgments and choices regarding settlement may be clouded by, and
settlement delayed by, lawyers’ excessive reliance on intuition, the desire to avoid
perceived loss; the tendency to seek confirmation of the biases they bring to litigation; the
notion that it is always better to have more information; and concerns about justifying
previously spent dollars in litigating a case.53 When settlement does not occur during the
preliminary stages of dispute resolution, the arbitration proceeding becomes the backdrop
against which negotiated settlement discussions will occur. In many such cases,
mediation is postponed until a relatively late stage in the pre-hearing process when
discovery is completed or well-advanced.54
Over the years, there have been efforts to “think outside the box” of the linear
framework of stepped dispute resolution by exploiting its potentialities in different ways.
For example, it has been suggested that mediators be equipped with a wider variety of
tools (such as a more nuanced appreciation of cognitive factors affecting negotiations) to
break impasse at early stages of conflict.55 They may also facilitate the parties’ focus on
key factual issues and related, limited information exchange56 or targeted binding or
nonbinding decisions by judges or arbitrators that could lay the groundwork for
resolution of conflict57--subjects we will re-visit below. Even where substantive issues
cannot be resolved in mediation, mediators may nevertheless focus on facilitating
agreements regarding dispute resolution process elements and helping parties to set the
stage for arbitration proceedings with features that are effectively tailored to the issues at
hand.58
51

Wistrich & Rachlinski, supra note 8, at 576; Lurie, supra note 2, at 21.

52

Id.; Lurie at20.

53

See generally id. See also RANDALL KISER, BEYOND RIGHT AND WRONG: THE POWER OF EFFECTIVE
DECISION MAKING FOR ATTORNEYS AND CLIENTS 89-195 (2010) (discussing “decision errors” by attorneys
and related psychological and institutional factors).
54

Id. at 19 (noting that “mediation is frequently seen as a tool to be used close to trial or an arbitration
hearing as a hedge against an unfavourable judgment or award”).
55

Id. at 19-20.

56

COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AT ITS BEST, supra note 48, at 19.

57

Lurie, supra note 2, at 20-21. Cf. Wistrich & Rachlinski, supra note 8, at 624-626.

58

Id. at 19-20. Paul Lurie’s Guided Choice concept actually centers on the notion of using mediation to
“diagnose” a dispute and assist parties in structuring an appropriate dispute resolution process, possibly
including an appropriately tailored form of arbitration. Other thoughtful suggestions for promoting earlier
settlement or more appropriate dispute resolution may be found in Alana S. Knaster, “Scientific

9

Finally, some have promoted or participated in forms of “med-arb,” by which we
mean a proceeding in which a single third party serves, or agrees to serve, as the mediator
and arbitrator.59 Sometimes, arrangements are made between disputing parties and a
third party “neutral” prior to the commencement of any services that the latter will
mediate the dispute and, failing a complete resolution of the dispute, will arbitrate all
outstanding matters.60 A variant of this kind of arrangement is “MEDALOA”—
mediation followed by last-offer (or final offer) arbitration.61 Sometimes, third parties
who are engaged in mediating a dispute are asked to shift to an arbitral role and
adjudicate the dispute;62 in other cases arbitrators are invited to assume the role of
mediators.63 These kinds of dual-role arrangements raise a variety of legal, practical, and
ethical issues that have led many practitioners and neutrals to avoid them,64 although they
tend to be more readily embraced in some other parts of the world.65 There are
indications, however, that many U.S. neutrals do engage in such activities, albeit
relatively infrequently.66
B. “Setting the Stage” for Settlement during Arbitration

Leading arbitration rules often include no specific reference to settlement other
than to make provision for terminating proceedings and recording the settlement in the
form of an arbitration award if the parties so agree.67 Rules such as those published by

Negotiations: ADR’s answer to the battle of expert witnesses, THE RECORDER 1 (Fall 1994); John A.
Sherrill, Cooperative Negotiation, Mediation and Arbitration: Creating a Sequential and More Efficient
Dispute Resolution Process (paper on file with Prof. Stipanowich).
59

See COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AT ITS BEST, supra note 48, at 20-24.

60

See id.

61

See id. at 25-26.

62

See id. at 22-24 (setting forth suggested guidelines for handling such arrangements) .

63

See id. at 29-30 (setting forth suggested guidelines for handling such arrangements).

64

See infra text accompanying notes130-134. See also id. at 20-22 (discussing attitudes of leading
arbitrators and practitioners on CPR Commission and concerns regarding med-arb); Thomas Stipanowich,
Contract and Conflict Management, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 831, 853-55 (2001), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1377917. See also CEDR COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 3 ¶ 2.5.
65

For an excellent tabular summary of different national laws and their posture regarding arbitrators’
promotion of and involvement in settlement efforts and related issues, see CEDR COMMISSION REPORT,
supra note 4, at Appendix 4, 18ff. See also Reflections on Med-Arb and Arb-Med: Around the world, 2
N.Y.DISP. RESOL. L. 71-119 (Spring 2009) (collection of articles highlighting use of med-arb and variants).
66

See Stipanowich, supra note 64, at 853-54. See also infra Part IV.C.

67

See, e.g., AAA INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION, INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE
RESOLUTION PROCEDURES Article 29(1) (Rules Amended and Effective June 1, 2009) (including provision
for termination of arbitration proceedings and for recording settlement as consent award if so agreed);
UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, UNCITRAL ARBITRATION RULES Article
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the International Institute for Conflict Prevention & Resolution (CPR) are exceptional in
providing more specific guidance for parties and arbitrators.68 The CPR Rules permit
arbitrators to “suggest that the parties explore settlement at such times as the Tribunal
may deem appropriate”69 and, with the consent of the parties, even arrange for mediation
of claims.70 Reflecting concerns regarding the need for separation of mediative and
arbitral functions, the CPR Rules direct that the mediator shall not be a member of the
arbitration Tribunal, and the Tribunal shall not be apprised of offers or statements made
during negotiations or mediation absent both parties’ consent.71
However, recent guidelines developed by organizations such as the International
Chamber of Commerce (ICC) and the College of Commercial Arbitrators (CCA) aimed
at promoting more cost-effective and efficient arbitration have also enhanced the
opportunities for early settlement, including approaches that permit arbitrators to help
“set the stage” for early resolution or negotiated settlement. In 2007, the ICC
Commission on Arbitration and ADR set up a Task Force on Reducing Time and Costs in
Arbitration that produced a report entitled Techniques for Controlling Time and Costs in

36(1) (as revised in 2010) (same); ICC RULES OF ARBITRATION 32 (1 Jan. 2012) (provision for recording
of agreement as consent award).
68

The CPR Rules for Non-Administered Arbitration of Business Disputes provide:
Rule 19: Settlement and Mediation
19.1

Either party may propose settlement negotiations to the other party at
any time. The Tribunal may suggest that the parties explore settlement
at such times as the Tribunal may deem appropriate.

19.2

With the consent of the parties, the Tribunal at any stage of the
proceeding may arrange for mediation of the claims asserted in the
arbitration by a mediator acceptable to the parties. The mediator shall
be a person other than a member of the Tribunal. Unless the parties
agree otherwise, any such mediation shall be conducted under the CPR
Mediation Procedure.

19.3

The Tribunal will not be informed of any settlement offers or other
statements made during settlement negotiations or a mediation between
the parties, unless both parties consent.

19.4

If the parties settle the dispute before an award is made, the Tribunal
shall terminate the arbitration and, if requested by all parties and
accepted by the Tribunal, may record the settlement in the form of an
award made by consent of the parties. The Tribunal is not obliged to
give reasons for such an award.

INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION & RESOLUTION, CPR RULES FOR NONADMINISTERED ARBITRATION OF BUSINESS DISPUTES Art. 19 (Effective Nov. 1, 2007). For a summary of
the provisions of various national arbitration laws on arbitrator involvement in settlement, see CEDR
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, Appendix 4 (summarizing pertinent elements of various national laws).
69

Id., Art. 19.1.

70

Id., Art. 19.2.

71

Id., Art. 19.2, 19.3.
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Arbitration.72 In 2009, the CCA, convened leading dispute resolution organizations and
stakeholders in a National Summit on Business-to-Business Arbitration to identify the
chief causes of excessive cost and delay in arbitration and to explore “concrete practical
steps” to remedy them.73 This led to the publication of the CCA Protocols for
Expeditious, Cost-Effective Commercial Arbitration,74 comprised of proposed action
steps for business users and in-house counsel, outside counsel, arbitrators and arbitration
provider institutions.75 The ICC Techniques and the CCA Protocols appear to have
resonated with many arbitrators and users of arbitration and to have influenced evolving
practices,76 some of which may also create or enhance the opportunity for a negotiated
settlement of all or part of the dispute. For example, the CCA Protocols enhance
opportunities for early resolution or settlement by encouraging the following:



contractual provisions for negotiation and mediation prior to arbitration;77
creative use of the skills of a mediator in laying the groundwork for arbitration,
including facilitating agreements regarding information exchange; clarifying
issues that have been resolved in mediation and framing issues to be arbitrated;
and “encourag[ing] parties to jointly submit the one or two most significant
questions of law or fact to the arbitrator for speedy resolution, and then return to
mediation;”78

72

ICC COMMISSION ON ARBITRATION AND ADR, TECHNIQUES FOR CONTROLLING TIME AND COSTS IN
ARBITRATION (August 2007).
73

THE COLLEGE OF COMMERCIAL ARBITRATORS PROTOCOLS ON EXPEDITIOUS, COST-EFFECTIVE
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: KEY ACTION STEPS FOR BUSINESS USERS, COUNSEL, ARBITRATORS AND
ARBITRATION PROVIDER INSTITUTIONS (Thomas J. Stipanowich et al, ed. 2010) [hereinafter CCA
Protocols] at 4-21. Other important set of guidelines with similar aims was developed under the auspices
of the New York State Bar Association. NEW YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION DISPUTE RESOLUTION
SECTION, GUIDELINES FOR THE ARBITRATOR’S CONDUCT OF THE PRE-HEARING PHAS OF DOMESTIC
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATIONS AND GUIDELINES FOR THE ARBITRATOR’S CONDUCT OF THE PRE-HEARING
PHASE OF INTERNATIONA ARBITRATIONS (2010-11). See also NEW YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION
DISPUTE RESOLUTION SECTION ARBITRATION COMMITTEE, REPORT ON ARBITRATION DISCOVERY IN
DOMESTIC
COMMERCIAL
CASES
(June
2009),
available
at
http://www.nysba.org/Content/NavigationMenu42/April42009HouseofDelegatesMeetingAgendaItems/isco
veryPreceptsReport.pdf.
74

See generally id.

75

Although aimed primarily at U.S. domestic arbitration, the CCA Protocols offer guidance that is
applicable to international arbitration. See, e.g., Doug Jones, Techniques in managing the process of
arbitration, 78(2) ARBITRATION 140. 144-45 (2012) (observing that guidelines in CCA Protocols respecting
limitations on discovery “are applicable to limiting document disclosure in international arbitration”). See
also Michael McIlwrath, Faster, cheaper: global initiatives to promote efficiency in international
arbitration, 76(3) ARBITRATION 532 (2010).
76

See Stipanowich, supra note 24, at 79-88 (discussing these standards and their impact).

77

CCA PROTOCOLS, supra note 73, at 25, 44.

78

Id. at 44-45. Cf. Wistrich & Rachlinski, supra note 8, at 624-625 (suggesting parties tighten discovery
limits as a means of focusing dispute resolution).

12








resort to mediation during the course of the arbitration proceeding;79
continuing active involvement during the dispute resolution process by business
clients and in-house counsel,80 permitting continuous monitoring of the course of
dispute resolution and periodic consideration and cost-benefit analysis of
settlement opportunities;81
“teeing up” of particular issues for early resolution when it is likely to promote
fruitful settlement discussions;82
“aggressive” action on motions for summary disposition that “hold reasonable
promise for streamlining or focusing the arbitration process:”83
adherence to established deadlines;84 where appropriate, the use of streamlined
procedures;85 early “fleshing out” of the case;86 and more targeted discovery;87 all
of which may stimulate earlier settlement.

The complete CCA-Straus Institute Survey results, soon to be published, reflect a
wide array of approaches experienced arbitrators are employing to actively and
efficiently manage cases through the pre-hearing and hearing stages.88 These activities,
undoubtedly influenced by initiatives like the CCA Protocols and related efforts,89 can
play a key role in settlement; this is exemplified by arbitrator management of dispositive
motions, discussed below.90

79

Id. at 65 (“If a professionally conducted mediation did not precede the arbitration (and sometimes even if
it did), counsel should raise with the client the possibility of a thorough mediation with a neutral not
involved in the arbitration.”).
80

Id. at 29-30 (role of business client, corporate counsel).

81

Id. at 64-65 (role of outside counsel).

82

Id. at 56; (role of provider institutions); 69 (role of arbitrators). Cf. Wistrich & Rachlinski, supra note 8,
at 626 (discussing active judicial case management, encouraging parties to pursue “diagnostic or important
discovery first”).
83

Id. at 36 (role of business users and counsel) ; 73-74 (role of arbitrators).

84

Id. at 26-28 (role of business users and counsel); 55 (role of arbitration provider institutions); 69-70 (role
of arbitrators).
85

Id. at 29 (role of business users and counsel); 55-56 (role of provider institutions).

86

Id. at 34-35 (role of business users and counsel); 57 (role of provider institutions); 70-71 (role of
arbitrators).
87

Id. at 26 (role of business users and counsel); 45-55 (role of provider institutions); 64 (role of outside
counsel); 72 (role of arbitrators).
88

See Stipanowich & Ulrich, supra note 14.

89

See Stipanowich, supra note 24, at 76-77 (discussing impact of ICC Techniques and CCA Protocols)

90

See infra text accompanying notes 122-129.
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C. Arbitrators Directly Facilitating Settlement: The CEDR Commission

The work of the CEDR Commission on Settlement in International Arbitration91
represents the first major international effort to focus specifically on settlement during
arbitration. Its stated intent is establish a broad-based international consensus on the role
of international arbitrators in facilitating settlement,92 but although the effort is in many
respects commendable it envisions roles for arbitrators in the active facilitation of
settlement that fall well short of a consensus model and are in some respects
controversial.93
To some extent, the CEDR Recommendations and CEDR Rules for Facilitation of
Settlement in International Arbitration cover ground also touched upon by other recent
guidelines, including the notion of conducting arbitration proceedings “in conjunction
with other processes to achieve efficient and cost-effective outcomes,”94 the value of
multi-tier dispute resolution clauses95 and the use of a “mediation window” during
arbitration.96
Central elements of the Rules, however, are drawn from German, Swiss and
Chinese practices97 that are not universally embraced. The Rules state that in the absence
of a contrary written agreement arbitrators may take any of the following measures for
the purpose of facilitating settlement:
1.1. provide all [p]arties with the [a]rbitral [t]ribunal’s
preliminary views on the issues in dispute in the arbitration
and what the [a]rbitral [t]ribunal considers will be necessary
in terms of evidence from each [p]arty in order to prevail on
those issues;

91

See id. at 3, 11-12.

92

Id. at 2. See Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, When Arbitrators Facilitate Settlement: Towards a
Transnational Standard, 25 J. LONDON COURT INT’L ARB. 2 (2009) (article by CEDR commission chair
discussing growth of international consensus regarding arbitrators as settlement facilitators, and examining
the potential of a uniform standard by which arbitrators can effectively fulfill that role). Ms. KaufmannKohler observes, “[A] transnational standard may well emerge on this issue as it has for many other topics
of arbitration law in the recent past.”
93

See generally Nappert & Flader, supra note 4. See infra text accompanying notes 99-105; see also infra
text accompanying notes 130-134 (discussing concerns regarding mixing of the roles of mediator and
arbitrator).
94

Id. at 3, ¶2.7.1.

95

Id. at 4,¶4.2.1.

96

The Rules require arbitrators to “insert a [m]ediation [w]indow in the arbitral proceedings when
requested to do so by all [p]arties in order to enable settlement discussions,” and, moreover, to “adjourn the
arbitral proceedings for a specified period so as to enable mediation to take place” in certain circumstances.
Id. at 5, 12.
97

Id. at 2, ¶2.2.

14

1.2. provide all [p]arties with preliminary non-binding findings on
law or fact on key issues in the arbitration;
1.3. where requested by the [p]arties in writing, offer suggested
terms of settlement as a basis for further negotiation;
1.4. where requested by the [p]arties in writing, chair one or more
settlement meetings attended by representatives of the
[p]arties at which possible terms of settlement may be
negotiated.98
These provisions go well the scope of other initiatives such as the ICC Techniques
and the CCA Protocols by projecting arbitration tribunals into a much more forthright
role as settlement masters. Many arbitrators are likely to be uncomfortable with
presenting preliminary views or findings, offering suggested settlement terms, or
facilitating settlement discussions.99 Any or all of these approaches may be seen by some
as undermining perceptions of arbitral impartiality,100 or taking arbitrators well beyond
their adjudicative comfort zone into a realm that may require different skills and a
different mindset.101 Others may be reasonably concerned about the ability of arbitrators
to filter out communications made during settlement discussions in arriving at an
award;102 or how and when an arbitration tribunal decides settlement facilitation should
occur;103 how tribunals are to reach a consensus on preliminary views or findings;104 and
how they are collectively to facilitate settlement between the parties.105
Despite these concerns, the CEDR Rules offer a platform for beta-testing of
procedures that thrust arbitrators into the heart of the settlement dialogue, and a tangible
alternative for those parties and arbitrators who are comfortable with the CEDR format.
For the time being, however, many parties and arbitrators may be reluctant to make the
leap afforded by the CEDR Rules.

98

Id. at 11. The only significant limitation imposed by the CEDR Rules on arbitrators facilitating
settlement is a prohibition on the use of caucuses and the sharing of information ex parte.
99

Nappert & Flader, supra note 4, at 461. Cf. Peter Robinson, Opening Pandora’s Box: An Empirical
Exploration of Judicial Settlement Ethics and Techniques, 27 OHIO. ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 53 (2012)
(discussing range of approaches to judges to promotion of settlement).
100

Id.

101

Id. at 467-68.

102

Id. at 461. Cf. Kristen M. Blankley, Keeping a Secret from Yourself? Confidentiality When the Same
Neutral Serves Both as Mediator and as Arbitrator in the Same Case, 63 BAYLOR L. REV. 317 (2011).
103

Id. at 465-7.

104

Id. at 467-8.

105

Id. at 468-9.
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III.

ARBITRATOR EXPERIENCES WITH AND ATTITUDES TOWARD SETTLEMENT
DURING ARBITRATION: RESULTS FROM THE CCA-STRAUS INSTITUTE
SURVEY
A. The Growing Incidence of Settlement during Arbitration

A decade ago, the American Bar Association’s symposium “The Vanishing Trial”
spotlighted a precipitous drop-off in the incidence of trial on the merits in litigation.106
Among other things, this decline in trial was ascribed to the costs of full-blown
adjudication and the risks associated with third party decision making.107 A litigated case
may settle prior to trial due to the granting of a motion for summary judgment or other
dispositive motion, a ruling on discovery, or a settlement conference, or mediation.108
Settlement may even be stimulated by the mere anticipation of a pending procedural
deadline.109
Settlement also appears to be an increasingly frequent occurrence during the
course of arbitration. CCA-Straus Institute Survey participants were asked, “Roughly
what percentage of cases in which you were an arbitrator settled prior to the first
arbitration hearing?” They were asked to report settlement percentages for two time
periods, “[p]rior to [five] years ago” and within the “past [five] years”; the resulting data
are summarized in Chart B. The majority of respondents indicated that higher
proportions of their caseloads settled pre-hearing during the last five years than prior to
that time. This trend is indicated both by a relative decrease in respondents reporting
lower proportions of their caseloads as having settled (e.g., less respondents reporting
106

See Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Federal and
State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 3, 459 (2004) (reporting on a working-paper analysis conducted
for the symposium, and showing that “the portion of federal civil cases resolved by trial fell from 11.5[%]
in 1962 to 1.8[%] in 2002, continuing a long historic decline”); cf. Queen Mary University of London &
PriceWaterhouseCoopers, supra note 21, at 16 (reporting that respondents indicated they were able to
settle, on average, 57% of international disputes prior to engaging in litigation, arbitration, or other formal
proceedings. Of disputes that were not settled amicably, only 32% were ultimately decided in formal
proceedings; the other 68% were not). See generally Thomas J. Stipanowich, ADR and “The Vanishing
Trial”: The Growth and Impact of “Alternative Dispute Resolution,” 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 3, 843
(2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 1380922 (a meta-survey and summary of empirical studies
examining the growth of ADR processes, resultant impact on court systems, and broader uses of and
rationale for mediation and other ADR-process choices).
107

Id. at 477-81, 500-05, 517, 519; cf. Patricia Lee Refo, Opening Statement: The Vanishing Trial, 30
A.B.A. LITIG. J. 2, 2-4 (Winter 2004).
108

See generally Hon. Patrick J. Walsh, Rethinking Civil Litigation in Federal District Court, 40 A.B.A.
LITIG. J. 1, 6-8 (Fall 2013) (discussing how “less than one percent of the civil cases that could go to trial
actually do” and arguing that such a high instance of court-case settlement means that motion practice,
discovery management and settlement efforts should be approached by judges with the assumption that
cases will settle, and that courts should consider introducing procedural mechanisms that facilitate and
encourage settlement).
109

Kenneth Glasner, Contract Disputes: The Role of ADR, DISP. RESOL. J. 50 (2000); Jeremy A. Mercer &
Evan A. Bloch, Settlement Tactics in US Litigation, PRACTICAL LAW COMPANY (2011), available at
http://www.pepperlaw.com/publications_article.aspx?ArticleKey=2262.
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that “31% to 40%,” or less, of their caseload settled pre-hearing) and by a relative
increase in respondents reporting higher proportions of their caseloads having settled
(e.g., more respondents reporting that “41% to 50%” and “[m]ore than 50%” of their
caseloads settled pre-hearing).
Chart B. Settlement prior to Hearing
Q: Roughly what percentage of cases in which you were an arbitrator
settled prior to the first arbitration hearing?
Percentage of Respondents

35.0%
30.5%

30.0%
26.0%

25.0%
20.0%

17.6%
14.5%
13.0%

15.0%

16.0% 15.3%

9.2%

10.0%
5.0%

13.7%

3.1%

15.3%

12.2%
9.2%

4.6%

0.0%
0%

1% to 10% 11% to 20% 21% to 30% 31% to 40% 41% to 50% More than
50%
Percentage of Cases
Prior to 5 years ago

Past 5 years

The Survey also asked respondents, “Roughly what percentage of cases in which
you were an arbitrator settled at any time prior to award?” Again, participants were
asked to distinguish between their experiences “[p]rior to [five] years ago” and those
within the past five years (Chart C). The responses to this question tell much the same
story as those displayed in Chart B, above. Experienced arbitrators indicate that, during
the past five years, higher proportions of their caseloads settled pre-award than before
that time. However, while the data reflect a general upward shift in extent of pre-award
settlement as well as the overall number of arbitrators whose cases are settling pre-award,
the data also reflect dramatic variances in settlement rates among arbitrators.
As might be expected, the data indicate that some disputes that did not settle prior
to hearings are settled during hearings. (For example, while 15.3% of respondents
indicated “[m]ore than 50%” of their caseload settled pre-hearing in the past five years,
22.9% of the same respondent pool indicated that proportion of their cases settled preaward (including those that settled after the hearing had begun). These results underscore
the potential impact of arbitrators’ case management at all stages of the process.
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Chart C. Settlement prior to Award
Q: Roughly what percentage of cases in which you were an arbitrator
settled at any time prior to award?
30.0%

Percentage of Respondents

26.0%

25.0%

22.9%

21.4%

20.0%

18.3%

9.2%

10.0%
5.0%

14.5%13.7% 13.7%

13.7%

13.7%

15.0%

15.3%

9.2%

5.3%
3.1%

0.0%
0%

1% to 10% 11% to 20% 21% to 30% 31% to 40% 41% to 50% More than
50%
Percentage of Cases
Prior to 5 years ago

Past 5 years

If cost-effectiveness and expeditious process are often important goals to
arbitrating parties, and if a growing number of parties are availing themselves of
opportunities to settle their disputes prior to hearings on the merits or the rendition of an
arbitration award, shouldn’t arbitrators be more conscious of their potential role in setting
the stage for early settlement? Why, given the fact an extremely high percentage of
litigated cases are resolved prior to trial110 and that contract cases are particularly likely to
settle,111 is the overall percentage of cases setting during arbitration not much higher?112
110

See supra note 106 and accompanying text.

111

Several studies have been conducted to analyze correlations between case-types and settlement, albeit
for cases adjudicated through the United States court system, but that nonetheless show tort- and contractrelated cases tend to have relatively higher settlement rates than other case types. See Theodore Eisenberg
& Charlotte Lanvers, What is the Settlement Rate and Why Should We Care?, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD.
1, 111-46 (Mar. 2009) (analyzing public records for two United States federal district courts, and showing
that tort [an 87.2% settlement rate one federal district for the time period analyzed] and contract cases [a
72.5% settlement rate] tend to have higher settlement rates than others examined); D. Trubek, J. Grossman,
W. Felstiner, H. Kritzer & A. Sarat, CIVIL LITIGATION RESEARCH PROJECT: FINAL REPORT, Part A, at 1-58,
1-72 (1983) (tbl.5) (empirical study indicating that a statistically significantly higher percentage of tort
cases were settled pre-trial than were contract or commercial cases, and that a statistically significantly
higher percentage of contract of commercial cases were settled than civil rights, civil liberties, or
discrimination cases). Since commercial arbitration is presumably dominated by contract-related disputes,
and to a lesser extent tort claims, one would expect a relatively high percentage of arbitrated disputes to be
resolved through settlement, as in court.
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Why do some arbitrators report much higher rates of pre-hearing or pre-award settlement
of their cases than others? Do these variances reflect differences in personal philosophies
regarding the arbitral role in settlement, arbitrators’ relative proactivity in case
management, or some other factors such as the mix of cases they arbitrate? With these
questions issue in mind, we will examine other data from the CCA-Straus Institute
Survey regarding perspectives on the roles of arbitrators in promoting settlement.
B. Varying Attitudes of Arbitrators Concerning Settlement

Survey participants were asked, “[h]ow often, if ever, are you concerned with
informal settlement of the cases before you as an arbitrator?” As reflected in Chart D,
more than half of participants responded, “Never.” Another third (34.4%) stated they
concern themselves with settlement “sometimes.” And only about twelve percent (11.8%)
of the respondents indicated they concern themselves with settlement as much as half the
time.

112

According to the American Arbitration Association, 65% of its commercial cases (a category that
includes cases involving business contracts and individually negotiated employment contracts) settled prior
to award in 2013. E-mail of Ryan Boyle, Vice President – Statistics and In-House Research, American
Arbitration Association to Thomas J. Stipanowich (June 16, 2014) (on file with Prof. Stipanowich). In the
years 2010 through 2014, only 21% to 23% of FINRA arbitration cases have been resolved by arbitrator
decision; between 59% and 65% have been resolved by direct settlement or mediation, with another 9% to
12% withdrawn. FINRA Dispute Resolution Statistics – How Arbitration Cases Close (May 2014),
available
at
http://www.finra.org/ArbitrationAndMediation/FINRADisputeResolution/AdditionalResources/Statistics/.
Cf. CEDR COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 1, ¶1.4 (reporting that “[s]ome research suggests that
settlement rates in arbitration are significantly lower than in many national courts, particularly those courts
where judges systematically promote early settlement and the use of ADR techniques such as mediation”).
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Chart D. Concern with Informal Settlement
Q: How often, if ever, are you concerned with informal settlement
of the cases before you as an arbitrator?
60%
53.91%
50%
40%
34.38%
30%
20%
10%
1.56%

5.47%

4.69%

Usually

About half the
time

0%
Always

Sometimes

Never

These responses are a bit surprising given the heightened incidence of settlement
in recent years. It is possible that at least some portion of those who answered “Never” to
the Survey question did so because they view their roles and responsibilities strictly
within the context of superintending complete arbitration processes that culminate in
awards, and do not believe it necessary or appropriate to actively consider or engage in
any way with the parties’ collateral settlement efforts. Their view of their role in case
management, in other words, is wholly framed in terms of the adjudicative dimension—
hearing the case and rendering an award—and ignores the possibility that the case might
be disposed of through settlement, however likely that might be, as irrelevant to their
function as arbitrators.113
Some, too, may have read the question to imply a direct facilitative role in
settlement along the lines of the CEDR Recommendations discussed above.114 It may be
that some respondents interpreted the question to be, “How often do you regard yourself
as personally responsible for settling the case?” or, in a more extreme vein, “How often
do you put on the hat of a mediator to facilitate settlement of an arbitrated case?” They
might feel a sense of discomfort with a role they believe requires them to employ skills or
mindsets that are very different from those of an adjudicator.115 More importantly, the
113

Even the CEDR Commission on Settlement in International Arbitration concluded that “[a]n arbitral
tribunal has a primary responsibility to produce an award, which is binding and enforceable,” although the
arbitral tribunal “should also take steps to assist the parties in achieving a negotiated settlement of part or
all of their dispute.” CEDR COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 2, ¶¶2.4.1-2.4.2.
114

See supra text accompanying notes 97-98.

115

Nappert & Flader, supra note 4, at 461.
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question may have stirred up the concerns of some respondents that too active a role in
facilitating or mediating settlement “might be perceived as incompatible with the
arbitrator’s duty of impartiality,”116 potentially undermining the arbitral function.117
The focus on “seeing the case through to an award” may be reinforced by the
pressures some arbitrators may feel to sustain a sufficiency of work hours in an
increasingly competitive environment. The stiff competition for commercial arbitration
appointments is underlined by data from the CCA-Straus Institute Survey: almost sixty
percent (59.5%) of College members, who count themselves among the U.S.’—and in
some cases possibly the world’s118—most experienced and prominent commercial
arbitrators, indicated they had less arbitration work than they would like.119
For some or all of the foregoing reasons, many experienced commercial
arbitrators are reticent about the arbitral role in settlement. However, the Survey results
also indicate that many arbitrators tend to recognize and actively embrace opportunities
to promote settlement of arbitrated cases through their management of the arbitration
process.

IV.

SETTING THE STAGE FOR SETTLEMENT
A. Case Management and Settlement

In the CCA-Straus Institute Survey, respondents who indicated some level of concern
regarding settlement were asked to indicate how and to what extent their own activities

116

Id.

117

Id. Shahla Ali reported the results of an empirical study showing that, even though just over seventy
percent of arbitrators from East Asia, North America and Europe see it as appropriate to suggest settlement
negotiations to parties, most arbitrators from all regions rarely actually do so (although, arbitrators in East
Asia tend to suggest settlement negotiations slightly more often than do arbitrators from North America or
Europe). Interestingly, the percentage of arbitrators who concerned themselves with informal settlement at
least some of the time was slightly higher among those who had never mediated a case (54.2%) than those
who had mediated. See Ali, supra note 16, at 8, 25. On the other hand, when the arbitrators were asked,
“[i]s it appropriate for the arbitrator to meet with parties separately to discuss settlement options (with both
parties’ request)?” 38% of respondents from North America and Europe answered “[y]es,” as did 43% of
respondents from East Asia. There was no statistically significant difference found between either
geographically-defined group’s responses to this question. While not addressing the role of the arbitrator
as “mediator” per se, the question does directly ask for respondents’ perceptions regarding the
appropriateness of an arbitrator conducting informal settlement discussions in a manner arguably the same
as a mediation caucus. Id. at 18.
118

See supra note 12 (describing international experience of Survey respondents).

119

Based on the Survey data, there does not appear to be a substantial difference between the arbitration
workloads of those experienced arbitrators with much domestic or international experience and those
without. There do appear to be, however, correlations between respondents’ workloads and other aspects
of their backgrounds: These dynamics will be examined in much further depth in Thomas J. Stipanowich &
Zachary P. Ulrich, Arbitration in Evolution: Current Practices and Perspectives of Experienced
Commercial Arbitrators (article in progress; draft available from the authors).
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might stimulate settlement (Table E).120 The large majority of this group indicated that
their management of the pre-hearing process, summary disposition of issues, and rulings
on discovery matters prompt settlement in at least some cases. Indeed, nearly one-fourth
of respondents (23.8%) indicated that their summary disposition of issues prompts
informal settlement in at least half of their cases, and more than a quarter (25.4%)
responded that their management of pre-hearing processes plays an important role in prehearing settlements in at least half of their cases.
Table E. Promotion of Informal Settlement
Q: As an arbitrator, how often do you do each of the following
with respect to informal settlement of the cases before you?
About half
Sometimes
the time

Always

Usually

Never

Total

Through my management of the
pre-hearing process, I play an
important role in helping to settle
the case prior to hearing.

0.0
%
(0)

20.3%
(12)

5.1%
(3)

57.6%
(34)

17.0%
(10)

59

My summary disposition of issues
prompts informal settlement of
the entire case.

0.0
%
(0)

6.8%
(4)

17.0%
(10)

66.1%
(39)

10.2%
(6)

59

My rulings on discovery matters
prompt informal settlement of the
entire case.

0.0
%
(0)

3.4%
(2)

3.4%
(2)

72.9%
(43)

20.3%
(12)

59

The complete Survey data are replete with more information about how
experienced arbitrators manage pre-hearing process, oversee discovery, and address
dispositive motions.121 For now, however, we will confine our discussion to a short
exemplary summary of Survey responses regarding the handling of dispositive motions.

120

Paralleling the CCA-Straus Survey results regarding arbitrators’ reported impact on informal settlement
are the results of a survey conducted in 2009 by our colleague Peter Robinson which asked 368 California
state trial judges and commissioners questions regarding their efforts to assist settlement and their
perceived success in doing so. In that study, much as with the CCA-Straus Survey, it was found that there
were significant variations in perspectives on the adjudicator’s role in promoting settlement. Forty-nine
percent of responding judges and commissioners reported reaching settlement 75% of the time or more (the
highest-percentage category examined) while another 38% of respondents indicated they reached
settlement in 50% or less of their conferences. See Peter Robinson, Settlement Conference Judge – Legal
Lion or Problem Solving Lamb: An Empirical Documentation of Judicial Settlement Conference Practices
and Techniques, 33 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 113, 114-18 (2009).
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B. Managing Motion Practice in Arbitration
Especially in the United States, commercial arbitration has tended to acquire
many of the trappings of court trial.122 This includes, among other things, more extensive
use of pre-hearing motions by counsel.123 In 2009, more than 180 arbitrators, corporate
counsel and attorneys representing clients in arbitration, attending a Summit on the
Future of Business-to Business Arbitration, identified “excessive, inappropriate or
mismanaged motion practice” as a “key source of cost and delay in commercial
arbitration, as reflected in the electronic spot survey results summarized in Chart F.124
Chart F. Motion Practice in Arbitration
Q: If you believe arbitration fails to meet the desires of business users
regarding speed, efficiency and economy, to what extent does excessive,
inappropriate or mismanaged motion practice tend to contribute to that
result?
35%
30.0%

30%

32.0%

25%
20%

17.0%

16.0%

15%
10%
5%

5.0%

0%
Not at all

Moderately

Very much

The subsequent CCA Protocols for Expeditious, Cost-Effective Commercial
Arbitration explained that in arbitration, dispositive motions are, “practically speaking, a
double-edged sword.”125 On the one hand, motion practice often adds to arbitration costs
and cycle time without clear benefits, as in court. The filing of a motion can trigger the
setting of a schedule for briefing and argument requiring major efforts by counsel, all of
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See CCA PROTOCOLS, supra note 73, at 4-12.
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Id. at 8-9. Cf. Wistrich & Rachlinski, supra note 8, at 626 (discussing need for active judicial
management of motion practice).
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Id. at 8.
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COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AT ITS BEST, supra note 48, at 203-06; Zela G. Claiborne, Constructing a
Fair, Efficient, and Cost-Effective Arbitration, 26 ALTERNATIVES TO THE HIGH COST OF LITIG. 186 (Nov.
2008). See also Albert G. Ferris & W. Lee Biddle, The Use of Dispositive Motions in Arbitration, 62 DISP.
RESOL. J. 17 (Aug.-Oct. 2007).
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which may come to naught if the arbitrators conclude that the unresolved factual disputes
require action on the motion to be postponed pending a full hearing on the merits.
On the other hand, motions may in some cases serve as an excellent means of
narrowing the issues in dispute and thereby reducing the scope of discovery and hearings.
Certain matters that do not implicate extensive discovery, presentation of evidence and
fact-finding may be effectively addressed early in the arbitration process, including
contractual limitations on damages, statutory remedies, or statutes of limitations and
other limits on legal causes of action.126 Where they may be appropriately granted, such
motions present arbitrators with opportunities to bring an end to some or all of the
disputes before them.127 The granting of a motion may also motivate a party to initiate
settlement discussions rather than incur the expense and risk of pursuing a claim that is
diminished in value and less amenable to pressing through adjudication. Conversely,
arbitrators’ reflexive refusal to come to grips with such issues represents a lost
opportunity to save the parties time and money.
As noted above, the CCA Protocols call for a measured approach to the handling
of dispositive motions, admonishing arbitrators to discourage the filing of unproductive
motions, but to act aggressively in considering those motions that present real
opportunities for shortening, streamlining or focusing the process.128 Other institutional
standards have embraced similar approaches.129
As reflected in Table G, responses to the CCA-Straus Institute Survey suggest
that most experienced arbitrators are making efforts to effectively manage motion
126

See CCA PROTOCOLS, supra note 73, at 9; COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AT ITS BEST, supra note 48, at
48, 53-55; see generally Adam Raviv, No More Excuses: Toward a Workable System of Dispositive
Motions in International Arbitration, 28 ARB. INT’L 3 487-510 (2012) (examining the potential for further
incorporation of dispositive motions into current international arbitration practice; examining commonly
cited downsides such as delays due to lengthened discovery, meritless motions, and enforceability in local
courts worldwide; and concluding that not only are all of these potential downsides to summary
adjudication in international arbitration outweighed by their benefits, but that dispositive motions can and
should be provided for by the operating rules of international arbitration providers and in arbitration
agreements).
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See Raviv, supra note 126, at 496 (discussing the possibility that meritless motions may unnecessarily
lengthen international arbitration proceedings, and concluding that “In any event, the possibility of drawnout, meritless motions is less a reason to forbid dispositive motions entirely than it is a reason to craft rules
and provisions that give parties an incentive only to bring dispositive motions that have a significant chance
of succeeding”); cf. Joe S. Cecil et al., A Quarter-Century of Summary Judgment Practice in Six Federal
District Courts, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 882−83 (2007) (reporting on 2007 empirical study of six U.S.
federal district courts’ handling of motions for summary judgment, and showing that, of the cases where
summary-judgment motions were filed, over half of the time those motions were successful, and over onethird of the time the cases were actually terminated by the summary-judgment ruling).
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practice and not decline the opportunity to come to grips with opportunities to resolve all
or part of the case in a summary fashion, early on. Many arbitrators also appear to be
taking steps to avoid abuse in the filing of motions by requiring moving parties to show
there will be a net savings in arbitration time, cost, or both.
Table G. Handling of Dispositive Motions
Q: As an arbitrator, how often do you do the following in handling
motions for summary disposition?

I readily and promptly rule on motions
for summary disposition of issues.
I decline to rule on motions for summary
disposition of issues, deferring such
matters until a hearing on the merits of
the case.
I require, before the filing of any motion
for summary disposition of issues, a
showing by the moving party that the
result will be a net savings in arbitration
time and/or costs.

Alway
s

Usuall
y

43.8%
(56)

28.9%
(37)

About
half the
time
4.7%
(6)

0.8%
(1)

14.1%
(18)

18.0%
(23)

18.0%
(23)

Sometime
s

Never

Tota
l

18.8%
(24)

3.9%
(5)

128

2.3%
(3)

47.7%
(61)

35.2%
(45)

128

3.9%
(5)

21.1%
(27)

39.1%
(50)

128

C. Participation in “Med-Arb”
There has long been a debate over whether mediators should assume the role of
arbitrator in the event mediation does not resolve all of the issues in dispute, or whether a
sitting arbitrator should accept the parties’ invitation to put on a mediator’s hat.130 In the
United States and many other places, the traditional view has been that although dual-role
“med-arb” may offer perceived benefits from the standpoint of increased efficiency
(since a single individual is conducting the entire proceeding) and greater impetus to
settle (since the mediator carries a “big stick” as the final adjudicator if negotiations fail),
it is usually inadvisable since the roles of mediator and arbitrator “are very different in
focus [and] in some respects incompatible.”131 Related concerns include (1) the
fundamental disjunction between mediation, which normally thrives on ex parte
communications between the third party intervener and the parties, and arbitration, which
involves presentation of evidence and argument in the presence of all parties; (2) the fear
that the “big-stick” wielded by the mediator-arbitrator will undermine party autonomy
130

See generally COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AT ITS BEST, supra note 48, at 20-27, 28-33 (as a part of the
final report of the CPR Commission on the Future of Arbitration, offering extensive discussion of issues
associated with mixed roles and offering detailed guidance on the subject). Cf. Peter Robinson, Adding
Judicial Mediation to the Debate about Judges Attempting to Settle Cases Assigned to Them for Trial, 2006
J. OF DISP. RESOL.335 (2006) (exploring conflicting perspectives and practices of California judges
regarding their role in settling cases assigned to them for trial).
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and self-determination; (3) the concern that parties will be less forthcoming during
mediation, thereby compromising the ability of the mediator to bring about a settlement;
(4) the fear that a mediator-turned-arbitrator’s perspective on the issues will have been
inappropriately influenced by information obtained during mediation; (5) in the absence
of a clear waiver, the concern that a subsequent arbitration award may be subject to a
motion to vacate on the basis of ex parte contact;132 and (6) questions about the
qualifications of the third-party intervener to play both roles.133 Despite all of these
concerns, however, there is evidence that many mediators and arbitrators in the United
States have engaged in med-arb, at least occasionally,134 and that proponents of these
“hybrid” processes see them as a valuable consensual alternative to more traditional
approaches if appropriately utilized.135 For this reason, the CCA-Straus Institute Survey
included a series of questions regarding med-arb.
Of the 59 respondents to the Survey who indicated some level of concern with
respect to informal settlement of disputes (representing 46.1% of all respondents), nearly
half (27 individuals, or 45.8%) indicated that they had served as both a mediator and an
arbitrator with respect to the same dispute.136 The specific kinds of scenarios in which
this experience occurred are reflected in Table H.
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Id. at 21-22. See also Blankley, supra note 102; Richard Fullerton, Med-Arb and Its Variants: Ethical
Issues for Parties and Neutrals, 65-OCT DISP. RES. J. 52 (May-Oct. 2010).
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See Gerald F. Phillips, Back to Med-Arb: Survey Indicates Process Concerns are Decreasing, 26
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Table H. Experience with Med-Arb
(Question to CCA Members who claimed to have experience with med-arb)
Q: Have you served as both an arbitrator and a mediator with respect to the
same dispute, where . . .
Yes

No

During mediation, the parties asked you to switch to the
role of arbitrator?

66.7%
(18)

33.3%
(9)

During arbitration, the parties asked you to switch to the
role of mediator?

92.6%
(25)

7.4%
(26)

The parties agreed at the outset that you would mediate
the dispute and, failing a resolution through mediation,
switch to the role of arbitrator.

66.7%
(18)

33.3%
(9)

Total
27
27

27

Shortly after the completion of the CCA-Straus Institute Survey, a parallel
canvass of experienced mediators was undertaken by the authors at the invitation of the
International Academy of Mediators, an organization of experienced mediators from the
U.S., the E.U. and some other parts of the world.137 This survey provided another
opportunity to explore the extent of experience in med-arb (Table I).
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The IAM-Straus Institute Survey on Mediator Practices and Perceptions was sent to 153 individuals, all
IAM Fellows, and 85.0% (130 individuals) participated in the survey; 78.4% (120 individuals) completed
the entire survey. The respondent pool included individuals who stated they “regularly practiced” in
Africa; Asia, including the Middle East; Australia and New Zealand; Canada; Europe (both Western and
Eastern, with a majority from the UK); Latin America; and the United States.
About ninety percent (89.8%) of respondents indicated that they worked “full-time” at the time the
Survey was administered, and devoted, on average, more than seventy percent of their work time to
mediation practice. Nearly half (47.7%) of respondents indicated that they devote more than ninety percent
of their work time to practice as a mediator. Survey participants had, on average, over eighteen years of
mediation experience, and had conducted, on average, almost 1,500 mediation cases throughout their
careers. (It should be noted that Survey participants were asked to select ranges of the estimated
percentage of their work time dedicated to mediation practice, the length of time since they first began
mediating, and the number of cases they estimated themselves to have previously mediated. The
respondent-pool averages were then calculated by multiplying the proportion of respondents selecting each
range by the lowest value in each range (e.g., for a range of “500-999” cases, it was assumed that all
respondents selecting that range chose “500”). Thus, the calculated averages stated here almost surely
underestimate the actual experience level of the respondent pool.)
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Table I. Experience with Med-Arb (IAM Members)
Q: How many times would you estimate you have served as both
a mediator and arbitrator, with respect to the same dispute, where . . .
0 times /
none

1-5
Times

6-10
times

11-25
times

26-50
times

51+
Total
times

During mediation, the parties
asked you to switch to the
role of arbitrator?

61.3%
(76)

20.2%
(25)

9.7%
(12)

2.4%
(3)

4.8%
(6)

1.6%
(2)

124

During arbitration, the parties
asked you to switch to the
role of mediator?

64.5%
(80)

20.1%
(26)

7.3%
(9)

4.8%
(6)

0.0%
(0)

2.4%
(3)

124

The parties agreed at the
outset that you would mediate
the dispute and, failing a
resolution through mediation,
switch to the role of
arbitrator.

52.4%
(65)

33.9%
(42)

5.7%
(7)

3.2%
(4)

3.2%
(4)

1.6%
(2)

124

As reflected in Table I, at least a third of responding experienced mediators had
had the experience of switching roles at the behest of the parties during the course of a
mediation or arbitration; nearly half claimed to have experience with med-arb where the
parties agreed ahead of time to conduct mediation, and if mediation failed the mediator
would switch to the role of arbitrator. A total of 76 of the 124 respondents to the
questions (61.3%) reflected some experience as a dual-role neutral.
Thus, despite evidence that multiple concerns regarding dual-role intervention
dissuade many from engaging in such activity, many arbitrators and mediators apparently
do so at least occasionally. Indeed, a majority of surveyed mediators have had at least
some experience with med-arb. Given these results, perhaps it is time to closely examine
the collective experiences of mediators, arbitrators and advocates with med-arb, to
ascertain whether and to what extent it can produce satisfactory experiences, and what
guidance (cautionary or otherwise) might be offered to those contemplating its use.138
V.

CONCLUSION: SOME STRAIGHTFORWARD PROPOSALS

We are in the midst of a continuous, expanding international dialogue that is
gradually spurring a re-assessment of the roles played by arbitrators and other
stakeholders in arbitration and dispute resolution processes. This evolution is
increasingly informed by a new wave of empirical studies including those that record and
examine perceptions and experiences, like the CCA-Straus Institute Survey, as well as
138

One possibility, proposed in Part V, would be a refinement of protocols for those contemplating the use
of med-arb in various settings. See infra text accompanying note 147.
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others that are bringing to the surface cognitive biases and filters.139 More and more, it
behooves arbitrators, as well as counselors and advocates, to approach their roles
thoughtfully and reflectively rather than reflexively.
Our brief consideration of settlement in arbitration suggests that the time is ripe
for informed discussion and deliberation respecting opportunities for settlement and the
appropriate roles of arbitrators with regard to the settlement of disputes. As commercial
arbitration has taken on more of the trappings of litigation such as extended pretrial
proceedings with accompanying motion practice and discovery, Survey data indicate that
the incidence of pre-award settlement has also increased.140 Recent initiatives focused on
promoting economy and efficiency in arbitration also create enhanced opportunities for
settlement before and during arbitration.141 The Survey data indicate that many
arbitrators are making efforts to more actively manage cases, including more effectively
handling dispositive motions142; the result will surely be not only reduced process cost
and cycle time, but also greater number of cases resolved earlier in the arbitration
process. It appears, too, that despite frequently pronounced concerns regarding the
pitfalls of acting as both mediator and arbitrator in the same dispute, many mediators and
arbitrators occasionally accept dual roles.143
Many arbitrators, arbitration practitioners and scholars are now recognizing that
the traditional paradigm of the arbitrator as single-minded adjudicator must be refined to
incorporate a broader concept of the arbitral role, including active case management at all
stages of the proceeding, early resolution of some or all issues, and activities that set the
stage for settlement.144 The Survey data, however, suggest that such attitudes are far
from pervasive, and that some arbitrators adhere to a mindset focused solely on resolution
through adjudication.
Guidelines for Settlement in Commercial Arbitration
A logical next step would be to lay the groundwork for a broader appreciation of
the opportunities that exist for achieving early resolution of arbitrated cases through
settlement. Recognizing that, as in dealing with the problem of excessive costs and
inefficiencies in arbitration, the solution must be a shared one involving all of the key
stakeholders in arbitration, the proposed effort would involve the development of an
authoritative set of guidelines giving clear direction to arbitrators as well as business
139
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users and corporate counsel, advocates and arbitration provider institutions on these
subjects along the lines of the CCA Protocols. Like the Protocols, these guidelines might
have an impact on practice as well as the formulation of future commercial arbitration
procedures.
Neither the CCA Protocols nor the ICC Techniques focus specifically on
settlement, while the CEDR Commission Report and resulting Rules fail to touch upon a
number of options for setting the stage for settlement. A set of Guidelines (or Protocols)
for Settlement in Commercial Arbitration, put together under the leadership of one or
more prominent organizations with the involvement of arbitrators, provider institutions,
corporate counsel and arbitration practitioners, could create a platform for mutual
appreciation and understanding of the ways in which early settlement may be most
effectively encouraged in arbitration. This would offer specific recommendations on
methods for setting the stage for settlement through exchange/discovery of key
information, effective handling of dispositive motions, and the like. It would also
provide specific examples of interplay between mediation and arbitration, including
“Guided Choice” options.145
In the course of developing such Protocols, there would also be an opportunity to
further examine the pros and cons of the approaches at the heart of the CEDR Rules,
including providing parties with preliminary views or findings of fact or facilitating
settlement conferences.146 The discussion should also embrace med-arb, particularly
since so many arbitrators and mediators engage in such activities at least occasionally.147
Even if there is not a consensus favoring the use of these approaches, some form of
guidance (including appropriate cautionary notes) might be developed for those wishing
to utilize them.148
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As a part of his Guided Choice platform, for example, attorney-mediator Paul Lurie, has proposed
language to create a mechanism for mediators to seek decisions from judges or arbitrators to help settle
cases. The proposed language (revised by Professor Stipanowich to focus solely on arbitrated cases) is as
follows:
The parties participating in mediation may agree that a binding or non-binding opinion
from an arbitrator pursuant to an agreement to arbitrate would be useful in helping to
settle the dispute. The suggested protocol for such a procedure would be:
 The mediator may assist the parties to define the issue to be submitted to the
arbitrator for an opinion.
 The submitted issues may include, but not be limited to, matters of jurisdiction,
discovery, motions to dismiss, pre-trial orders, evidentiary matters and summary
judgment.
 An informal opinion will only be given to the mediator, who will communicate its
substance in a manner which the mediator determines to be the most likely to help
settle the case.
 This informal opinion will not be part of any record used in a subsequent proceeding
if the case does not settle.
E-mail from Paul M. Lurie to Thomas Stipanowich, May 2, 2014 (on file with Prof. Stipanowich).
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Earlier templates for such guidance are contained in the Report of the CPR Commission on the Future of
Arbitration. See COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AT ITS BEST, supra note 48, at 22-24 (“Guidelines for
situations where parties desire a mediator to assume the role of arbitrator” ), 29-32 (“The arbitrator as
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Ethical Guidelines
Consideration might also be given to related ethical guidelines for dispute
resolution professionals. This could take the form of proposals to revise the Code of
Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes149 and the IBA Rules of Ethics for
International Arbitrators150 to incorporate more specific treatment of the role of
arbitrators in settlement. Alternatively, an annotation or commentary on the application
of the current standards to settlement-related scenarios could be developed.
Of course, legal counselors and advocates must play a leading role in creating
appropriate opportunities for settlement during the course of dispute resolution. To this
day, however, no set of specific ethical guidelines exists for attorneys who draft dispute
resolution agreements and represent clients in mediation and arbitration. Today, as
growing attention is being given to the ethical responsibilities of legal counselors and
advocates in international arbitration,151 it would be appropriate to develop ethical
guidelines for U.S. practitioners that reflect current U.S. practice but that take note of or,
to the extent possible, are harmonized with developing international norms. Such a
project might begin as an annotated version of the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct152 for legal counselors and advocates in commercial arbitration, to be used as a
basis for education and training.153

mediator in the same matter” and Draft Protocol for Arbitrators Who Participate in Settlement
Discussions”). See also CEDR COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 13-15 (“Safeguards for arbitrators
who use private meetings with each party as a means of facilitating settlement”). Another interesting
possibility would be the creation of a Commission on Mixed Roles in Dispute Resolution (see draft concept
paper on file with Professor Stipanowich).
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International Arbitration (Bocconi Legal Studies Research Paper No. 18-2010, 2010), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1559012.
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A beginning of this effort may be found in Thomas J. Stipanowich, Effective Advocacy in Arbitration:
What Arbitrators Wish Lawyers Knew (draft on file with Prof. Stipanowich).
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